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INTRODUCTION 
On December 8, 2007, Thomas Gore was illegally hunting 
deer with his son in the woods of eastern Texas, where he was 
discovered by the police with a loaded Remington rifle.1  Gore 
was cited for baiting deer and indicted for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.2  He had four prior felony convictions: 
three for drug offenses in 1997 and one for conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery in 1982.3  During the 1982 conspiracy, Gore 
did not have a firearm and did not participate in the commission 
of the substantive offense.4 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas found that Gore’s prior convictions qualified for imposition 
of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act5 (“ACCA”), a sentence reserved for 
those convicted of felonious possession of firearms or ammunition 
who previously were convicted of at least three violent felonies or 
serious drug offenses.6  Normally, Gore would not have qualified 
1 Brief of Appellant Thomas Gore at 2, United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 09-41064), 2010 WL 5778111; Brief for the United States at 3, Gore, 
636 F.3d 728 (No. 09-41064), 2010 WL 5778113. 
2 Brief for the United States, supra note 1. Gore was also cited for not having a 
valid driver’s license. Id. 
3 Id. at 3–4. Gore received probation for the conspiracy conviction. Brief of 
Appellant Thomas Gore, supra note 1. Two of Gore’s drug offenses occurred on the 
same occasion and were considered one offense for ACCA sentencing purposes. Brief 
for the United States, supra note 1, at 5. 
4 Brief of Appellant Thomas Gore, supra note 1. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4. 
6 § 924(e)(1). Combining prior serious drug offenses and violent felonies to reach 
three offenses for sentencing is permitted, but this Note focuses on violent felonies. 
See id. 
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for the enhanced sentence and would have been sentenced to 
approximately three years in prison,7 but because the court 
labeled Gore’s conspiracy conviction as an ACCA violent felony, 
Gore received a fifteen-year prison sentence.8  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Gore’s sentence.9  
Gore was not a violent career criminal in any colloquial sense of 
the term.10  Only one of Gore’s prior convictions was for what the 
district court considered to be a violent felony, the 1982 
conspiracy conviction,11 and Gore was not even armed in 
connection with the commission of this conspiracy.12 
Gore’s situation reveals the devastatingly unjust effect the 
ACCA mandatory minimum can have on an individual who is not 
in fact a violent criminal.  This Act was drafted to incapacitate 
recidivists who had proven themselves to be capable of deliberate 
violence,13 yet here it was used to imprison a reformed father for 
a mandatory fifteen years.14 
Recently, in Johnson v. United States,15 the United States 
Supreme Court confronted the ACCA definition of violent felony 
and found one provision, known as the residual clause, to be 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause.16  The Court noted that this vague provision 
created a split of authority among the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals about conspiracy under the residual clause and 
7 Brief of Appellant Thomas Gore, supra note 1; Brief for the United States, 
supra note 1, at 4. 
8 Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4. 
9 United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 2011). 
10 Career Criminal Definition, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.collins 
dictionary.com/dictionary/english/career-criminal (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (defining 
“career criminal” as “a person who earns his income through criminal activities”); 
Violent Definition, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/ 
dictionary/english/violent (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (defining “violent” as “tending to 
the use of violence, esp [sic] in order to injure or intimidate others”). 
11 Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
12 Brief of Appellant Thomas Gore, supra note 1. 
13 See infra Part I.A. 
14 Gore was sentenced under the residual clause and would not have been 
convicted by the Fifth Circuit under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Gore, 636 F.3d at 730. 
However, Gore still serves as a stunning example of the extreme, negative effects of 
a crime being deemed a violent felony. See generally Gore, 636 F.3d 728. 
15 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The Supreme Court has 
not directly or definitively addressed whether conspiracy crimes are violent felonies 
under the ACCA. 
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was extremely difficult to precisely apply.17  However, the Court 
also clarified that its Johnson decision did not call into question 
the remainder of the ACCA’s definitions of violent felony, 
including that under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).18 
While the Johnson decision was a move toward a more just 
sentencing scheme, it did not go far enough.  Courts are still split 
on whether to classify conspiracies to commit violent felonies as 
violent felonies.19  Although conspiracy crimes can no longer be 
classified as violent crimes under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), courts have 
done so in the past and are permitted by the Supreme Court to 
continue classifying conspiracy crimes as violent felonies under 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i).20 
When considering whether or not a crime is a violent felony, 
courts apply a formal categorical test, meaning the court only 
looks to statutory definitions of prior offenses and not underlying 
facts.21  The circuit courts disagree over whether they should look 
to both the elements of the conspiracy and the elements of the 
underlying crime in determining whether conspiracy to commit 
that crime is a violent felony.22 
This Note argues that conspiracies to commit violent felonies 
are not violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because, while 
criminals may participate in conspiracies in the hopes of 
accomplishing the underlying offense, conspiracies are distinct 
crimes and do not categorically have elements of threatened, 
attempted, or actual use of physical force.  Part I of this Note 
describes relevant legal history behind the ACCA, the applicable 
law, and the process courts use to determine whether criminals 
are subject to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum.  Part II 
analyzes the approaches represented in the circuit split.  Part III 
demonstrates how relevant legislative history, case law, and 
policy considerations indicate that conspiracies to commit violent 
felonies are not violent felonies under the ACCA.  Part III also 
proposes a rearrangement of factors considered in the categorical 
approach. 
17 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560. 
18 Id. at 2563. 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
21 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
22 See infra Part II. 
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. Circumstances Surrounding the Adoption of the ACCA 
In the 1970s, crime rates, particularly for violent crimes, 
looked to be on an unstoppable climb.23  As a result, the 
American public was very uneasy, and Congress felt enormous 
pressure to take some sort of action.24  Thus, Congress began 
promulgating aggressive anticrime legislation.25  In this 
legislation, Congress addressed public anxiety by extending 
incarceration and implementing a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum for armed career criminals responsible for multiple 
violent offenses.26  In the discussion in the House of 
Representatives, Representative Jerry Patterson stated that this 
use of sentencing would “continue[] the war against crime by 
substantially increasing sentences for violent offenders.”27  In the 
same discussion, Representative Patterson specifically referred 
to recidivists convicted of armed burglary or robbery as the 
“segment of the criminal population” that Congress wanted to get 
“off the street” to reduce violent crime.28  Additionally, the 
lawmakers cited numerous statistics about the pervasiveness of 
violent crime and the small number of recidivists responsible.29  
In 1984, Congress passed the Armed Career Criminal Act of 
1984,30 which defined “violent felony” as “robbery or burglary, or 
both.”31  Significantly, Congress specifically eliminated a  
 
 
23 Uniform Crime Reports: Total Arrests by Age and Crime, 1970–2003, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/dtdata.cfm 
(spreadsheet available by clicking hyperlink after “Arrests by age group”). 
24 130 CONG. REC. 29,671 (1984) (statement of Sen. Biden). During 
congressional discussion about the formation of the ACCA, Representative Hughes 
stated that “[crime] is unquestionably one of the top concerns of the people of 
America.” Id. at 30,314 . 
25 Id. at 29,999 (statement of Rep. Reid) (“There is no doubt that we need 
tougher crime controls, and [mandatory minimum sentencing] is just one important 
way to show our Nation that we are prepared to legislate . . . to help resolve this 
terrible problem [of violent crime].”). 
26 Id. at 29,688 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
27 Id. at 31,742.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 29,671, 29,688, 29,695–96. 
30 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1802, 98 Stat. 2185. 
31 H.R. REP. NO. 98-1078, at 3, 8 (1984). 
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proposed definition of violent felony that included “any robbery or 
burglary offense, or a conspiracy or attempt to commit such an 
offense.”32 
In 1986, Congress amended the ACCA definition of violent 
felony to comprise burglary, arson, extortion, crimes that involve 
the use of explosives, or crimes that “otherwise involve[] conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”33  But, like in 1984, Congress declined to expressly 
include conspiracy crimes as violent felonies.34  Section 924(e) of 
the ACCA has not been amended since 1986.35 
B. The Applicable Law in Determining Whether Conspiracy Is a 
Violent Felony 
1. The Structure of the Relevant Section of the ACCA36 
For the mandatory minimum under § 924(e)(1) to apply, a 
defendant first must have violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).37  This 
statute makes it a crime for a person who has been convicted of a 
felony to possess a gun or ammunition.38  If convicted, a 
defendant cannot be sentenced to more than ten years.39 
 
 
32 S. 52, 98th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess. 1984). 
33 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207, 3240 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
36 The Sentencing Guidelines’ language is almost identical to that of the ACCA, 
except the Guidelines refer to “crime of violence” in place of “violent felony.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
Application Note 1 to the relevant Guideline provision states that conspiracy crimes 
are crimes of violence. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 
However, the Guidelines and the ACCA are distinct because the Guidelines do not 
share the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 
756, 760 (7th Cir. 2012). Therefore, courts have held that analysis involving the 
ACCA term “violent felony” should be separate from Guidelines analysis, and the 
Application Note does not apply to ACCA analysis. United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 
435, 441 (7th Cir. 2013). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
38 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West 2014). Section 922(g) includes an extensive list of 
other persons for whom it would be unlawful to possess firearms or ammunition, but 
felons are most relevant to this Note. Id. 
39 § 924(a)(2). 
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However, if the defendant has three prior convictions for 
violent felonies, committed on different occasions, the defendant 
is subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.40  The 
ACCA defines “violent felony” as any felony that “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.”41  Thus, the ten-year 
maximum sentence for violating § 922(g) becomes a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum if one has been convicted of three prior 
violent felonies.42 
2. Elements of a Conspiracy Offense 
Generally, to be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime, 
one must, with intent to contribute to the commission of the 
underlying offense, agree with at least one other person to either 
commit that crime or to aid in the commission of that crime.43  
The Supreme Court has “consistently held that the common law 
understanding of conspiracy ‘does not make the doing of any act 
other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability.’ ”44  
However, some state statutes require that a conspirator also 
perform an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy or that 
someone in the conspiracy performs such overt act.45  The overt 
40 § 924(e)(1). Convictions for serious drug offenses also count and may be 
combined with any violent felony to subject the defendant to the ACCA mandatory 
minimum. Id. 
41 § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). A crime may also qualify as a violent felony under 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), but this provision is irrelevant to the issue of conspiracy. 
Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) states that a crime is a violent felony if it “is burglary, arson, 
or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” In Johnson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that the residual clause following the list of qualifying felonies 
is unconstitutionally vague because it leaves “grave uncertainty” both about how to 
estimate risk posed by a crime and about how much risk is needed for a crime to be a 
violent felony. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015). Thus, only burglary, arson, extortion, 
or crimes involving the use of explosives are violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
See id. at 2563. 
42 § 924(a)(2), (e)(1). 
43 See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994). 
44 Id. at 13–14 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)). 
45 For example, under the Model Penal Code, persons may be convicted of 
conspiracy if, to “promot[e] or facilitat[e]” the commission of the substantive offense, 
they agreed with others to commit a crime or to aid in the commission of a crime and 
if one of the conspirators committed “an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.” 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1), (5) (2015). Numerous state conspiracy statutes use 
the same or a substantially similar definition of conspiracy. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1003 (2016); CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West 2016); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 706.1 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5302 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. 
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act requirement is not onerous.46  Normally, in states with an 
overt act requirement, any act in furtherance of the conspiracy is 
sufficient for a conspiracy conviction;47 an act that would be legal 
but for the conspiracy qualifies as an overt act.48 
C. Determining Whether a Felon Should Be Sentenced Under 
the ACCA 
If a prosecutor believes that a defendant qualifies as an 
armed career criminal and should be sentenced as one, the 
prosecutor may request sentencing under the ACCA.49  The 
prosecution has substantial discretion in determining whether or 
not to invoke the ACCA.50  Once the prosecution shows that the 
mandatory minimum applies, the judge has no discretion to 
impose a lesser sentence, even if the judge believes that justice 
requires a sentence of less than fifteen years in prison.51 
 
ANN. § 2C:5-2 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.20 (McKinney 2016); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 12.1-06-04 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 423 (West 2016); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 903 (West 2016). However, some states do not require 
commission of overt acts for conspiracy convictions. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 
(West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.490 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-
2 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.450 (West 2016). 
46 United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he purpose of 
[the overt act] element is to require the Government to demonstrate that the 
conspiracy was actually ‘at work.’ ”); In re Interest of J.C.S., 565 N.W.2d 759, 761 
(N.D. 1997) (“The burden to prove an overt act is minimal, since nearly any act in 
furtherance of the agreed-upon crime will satisfy the requirement.”). 
47 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 82. 
48 Id. (“The overt act may itself be lawful . . . .”). 
49 Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 2. PSR stands for pre-sentence 
report. Id. 
50 Crime rates of some of the most common violent felonies—burglary and 
robbery—have fallen from a rate of 684.5 per 100,000 in 1995 to 403.6 per 100,000 in 
2010. Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate Per 100,000 Inhabitants, 
1991–2010, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls (last 
visited June 12, 2016). But during the same time, the number of prisoners defined as 
armed career criminals increased from 1.4% in 1995 to 2.9% in 2010. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, ch. 9, at 288 (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-
minimum-penalties/report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-
criminal-justice-system. This trend suggests the possible overuse of the ACCA 
fifteen-year sentence. At minimum, the figures demonstrate a need to reexamine 
which crimes qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. 
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). 
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To assist courts in determining whether a crime is a violent 
felony under the ACCA, the Supreme Court has adopted a 
categorical test (“categorical test”).52  This test requires courts to 
look to the elements of previous crimes rather than any 
underlying facts in determining whether or not the previous 
crimes qualify as violent felonies.53  The categorical test applied 
by courts reflects Congress’s effort to target specific types of 
crime through the ACCA sentencing enhancements by providing 
enhanced sentencing for “all crimes having certain common 
characteristics—the use or threatened use of force, or the risk 
that force would be used—regardless of how they were labeled by 
state law.”54  Thus, the categorical test ensures that the ACCA is 
applied to those crimes it was drafted to target.55 
II. THE DIVISION AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
Although all circuit courts generally apply the categorical 
test, they are divided on whether conspiracies to commit violent 
felonies are themselves violent felonies under the ACCA.56  
Essentially, the circuit courts dispute whether courts, in applying 
the categorical test to determine whether or not a crime is a 
violent felony under the ACCA, should look solely to the elements 
of the conspiracy offense or to those of the underlying crime.57 
A. Circuits That Have Held Conspiracy To Commit a Violent 
Felony To Be a Violent Felony Under the ACCA 
The United States Courts of Appeal for the First, Third, 
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits (“majority”) applied the categorical 
test and determined that each of the defendants’ prior conspiracy  
 
 
 
52 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015) (citing Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). 
53 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
54 Id. at 589. 
55 See id. 
56 See infra Part II.A–B. 
57 Compare United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 86–87 (3d Cir. 1990), with 
United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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convictions qualified as violent felonies.58  The majority reasoned 
that conspiracy crimes are violent felonies when the underlying 
crime is a violent felony.59 
The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Preston60 best 
illustrates the reasoning used by the majority.  Dale Preston 
asserted that the district court erred in applying the ACCA 
mandatory minimum sentence because he had not been convicted 
of three prior violent felonies;61 the court had considered his 
conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery to be one of the 
predicate violent felonies.62  The Third Circuit affirmed, finding 
that conspiracy to commit robbery is a violent felony under 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i).63  The court reasoned that, because 
Pennsylvania’s conspiracy statute requires the prosecution to 
show that a specific crime was underlying the conspiracy, the 
conspiracy crime subsumes the elements of the underlying 
crime.64  Thus, applying the categorical test in this context, the 
court held that conspiracy to commit robbery was a violent felony 
because it subsumes the elements of the object of the 
conspiracy—robbery, a violent felony.65  Similar reasoning is used 
by the other circuits.66 
As Preston indicates, the majority asserts that, when 
applying the categorical test, courts should consider conspiracy 
convictions to include each of the elements of the substantive 
crime; the result is that a conspiracy conviction is a violent felony 
when the object of the conspiracy was a violent felony.67  
58 United States v. Wilkerson, 286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam); United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1998); Preston, 910 F.2d 
at 87. 
59 Hawkins, 139 F.3d at 34; Wilkerson, 286 F.3d at 1325; Preston, 910 F.2d at 
87. 
60 910 F.2d 81. 
61 Id. at 84. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 86. 
64 Id. at 86–87. 
65 Id. at 87. 
66 United States v. Wilkerson, 286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) 
(considering both of the definitions of violent felony under the ACCA and stating 
that the formation of an agreement to commit a violent felony would be sufficient, 
regardless of any overt act element); United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 34 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (holding that, because robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA, “it is 
clear that the district court committed no error in concluding that [Hawkins’s] 
conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery was a qualifying predicate to his 
being sentenced under the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements”). 
67 See Wilkerson, 286 F.3d at 1326; Hawkins, 139 F.3d at 34. 
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Essentially, if the state conspiracy statute requires anything 
concerning the specific underlying crime, and that underlying 
crime is a violent felony, the conspiracy itself is a violent felony 
under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).68  Thus, the majority broadly defines 
“violent felony” to include conspiracy crimes. 
B. Circuits That Have Held Conspiracy To Commit a Violent 
Felony To Not Be a Violent Felony Under the ACCA 
Applying the same categorical test, the United States Courts 
of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits (“minority”) 
have determined that conspiracies to commit violent felonies are 
not themselves violent felonies.69  These circuit courts have held 
that conspiracies to commit violent felonies do not have as 
elements “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.”70 
For the minority, the categorical test limits courts to 
examining elements of the charged crime—conspiracy—and not 
the underlying one.71  For example, in United States v. Fell,72 
Nathaniel Fell was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary, 
and the district court determined that he committed a violent 
felony under the ACCA.73  Fell appealed, and the Tenth Circuit 
held that the conspiracy crime was not a violent felony under 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because “Colorado law does not require proof of 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force to 
sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit second degree 
burglary.”74  Similarly, when faced with a defendant who had 
been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, the Fifth Circuit, 
68 See Preston, 910 F.2d at 86–87; see also United States v. Gloss, 661 F.3d 317, 
319 (6th Cir. 2011) (“If a conviction for facilitation or conspiracy requires the 
government to prove the elements of the underlying violent felony, such a conviction 
will itself qualify as a violent felony under the first clause of § 924(e)(2)(B).” (citing 
Preston, 910 F.2d at 86)). 
69 See generally United States v. Gore, 636 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. White, 571 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fell, 511 F.3d 1035 
(10th Cir. 2007); United States v. King, 979 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1992). But see 
United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700, 706 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that conspiracy 
to commit a carjacking was a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B)). 
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Gore, 636 F.3d at 731; White, 571 F.3d 
at 369; Fell, 511 F.3d at 1037; King, 979 F.2d at 803 (“Clearly neither actual nor 
attempted use of force is required for conviction under conspiracy law . . . .”). 
71 E.g., King, 979 F.2d at 803. 
72 511 F.3d 1035. 
73 Id. at 1036. 
74 Id. at 1037. 
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in United States v. Gore,75 held that conspiracy was not a violent 
felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).76  The applicable Texas conspiracy 
law required agreement and commission of an overt act in 
furtherance of that agreement.77  Thus, in applying this statute, 
the court in Gore “agree[d], that under Texas law, a conviction for 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery does not have ‘as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.’ ”78  The Fourth Circuit, in 
United States v. White,79 also applied “a categorical analysis to 
the Conspiracy Offense,” conspiracy to commit robbery, and held 
that it was not a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).80 
The minority asserts that the fact that the underlying crime 
is related by association to the conspiracy charge does not bring 
the elements of the underlying crime into the categorical 
analysis.81  Even though many conspiracy statutes require that 
the object crime be explained to the jury in a conspiracy 
prosecution, elements of the object crime are still not subsumed 
by the conspiracy crime.82  Unlike in Preston, where the court felt 
that this requirement meant that the elements of the underlying 
felony were subsumed into the conspiracy crime, the minority 
looks primarily to the elements of the conspiracy statute.83  
Where conspiracy involves merely reaching a felonious 
agreement—the main requirement for many conspiracy 
statutes—the conspiracy crime is not a violent felony because it 
does not include the attempted, threatened, or actual use of 
physical force, regardless of the underlying felony.84  For the  
 
75 636 F.3d 728. 
76 Id. at 731. 
77 Id. (stating that, in the Fifth Circuit, courts also conduct analysis of the 
elements of the target offense of the conspiracy crime, but suggesting that this 
analysis does not factor into determinations under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). 
78 Id. at 730 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012)). 
79 571 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2009). 
80 Id. at 366, 369. While the residual clause portion of this decision has been 
abrogated by Johnson v. United States, White still demonstrates that the Fourth 
Circuit has found that conspiracy crimes are not violent felonies under 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 
81 See cases cited supra note 70. 
82 See cases cited supra note 70. 
83 Compare United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1990), with Gore, 
636 F.3d at 731, White, 571 F.3d at 369, and United States v. Fell, 511 F.3d 1035, 
1037 (10th Cir. 2007). 
84 See United States v. King, 979 F.2d 801, 802 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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minority, to determine whether conspiracy to commit a violent 
felony is a violent felony, the categorical test only allows 
examination of the elements of the conspiracy offense.85 
III. CONSPIRACY CRIMES ARE NOT VIOLENT FELONIES 
Conspiracies to commit violent felonies are not themselves 
violent felonies because conspiracies do not have as an element 
“the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another.”86  Conspiracies are considered to 
be separate from the object crime.87  Blending elements of the 
object crime with the conspiracy conviction for an ACCA violent 
felony determination is dangerous for defendants and for the 
integrity of the justice system as a whole.88  To do so renders 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), a clear provision but for the majority’s 
interpretation, unconstitutionally vague and impossible to 
precisely apply.89  Moreover, under such facts, a conspiracy crime 
would likely become attempt rather than conspiracy, a different 
crime altogether.90  Additionally, the majority’s interpretation is 
inconsistent with the legislative history, statutory interpretation, 
and underlying policies of the ACCA.91  Proper application of the 
categorical test means that conspiracies to commit violent 
felonies are not violent felonies under § 924(e)(B)(2)(i). 
85 See id. at 803. 
86 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
87 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (10th ed. 2014) (“Conspiracy is a separate 
offense from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy.”). 
88 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (holding that  
sentencing someone under a statute that is imprecisely applied by courts violates 
the Due Process Clause). 
89 Courts cannot accurately apply the ACCA residual clause to other crimes if 
the clause is interpreted so broadly as to include conspiracies to commit violent 
felonies as violent felonies. See infra Part III. 
90 The Model Penal Code states: 
[A] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if . . . he: purposely 
engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as he believes them to be; or . . . does or omits to do 
anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause [a 
particular] result without further conduct on his part; or purposely does or 
omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to 
be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step . . . [towards] 
commission of the crime. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (2015). 
91 See supra Part I.A. 
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A. The Purpose of the ACCA’s Definition of Violent Felony 
Conspiracy crimes do not fit within the purpose for which the 
ACCA was created—to target criminals who intentionally and 
persistently commit the types of crimes that make their 
communities significantly less safe.92  Even the Supreme Court 
has recognized Congress’s narrow focus in drafting the ACCA, 
with Justice Breyer stating that Congress only intended the 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum to apply when there was an 
increased chance that the criminal is “the kind of person who 
might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”93  The 
legislative history behind the ACCA indicates that Congress 
meant for the ACCA’s mandatory minimum to serve utilitarian 
goals, incapacitating the type of criminal who had been proven to 
be more likely to intentionally harm others, thus protecting 
society by removing the violent recidivist from the community.94  
Arguably, the provision was also meant to serve retributive 
goals, with the mandatory minimum for violent felonies 
reflecting an increased moral desert or need to “bring[] these 
particularly dangerous criminals to justice.”95  Under either 
interpretation, conspiracy crimes are not consistent with 
Congress’s intended meaning for violent felonies.96 
A conspiracy conviction is not sufficient to indicate that a 
criminal is capable of deliberate acts of violence or even the 
attempted or threatened use of physical force.97  Congress 
intended to target recidivists who had proven themselves to be 
capable of deliberate violence;98 therefore, in 1984, Congress 
expressly rejected proposed language that would have listed 
conspiracies to commit robbery or burglary as violent felonies.99  
92 127 CONG. REC. 22,669 (1981) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
93 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008). 
94 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 2 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3661, 3662. 
95 129 CONG. REC. 599 (1983). Here, Senator Specter was referring to recidivists 
who had been convicted of robberies or burglaries and are “subsequently charged 
with a third robbery or burglary committed with a firearm.” Id.; MICHAEL MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 191 (1997) (stating that 
retributive theory is based upon moral desert). 
96 See supra Part I.A. 
97 Rather, a conspiracy conviction primarily shows that the criminal was willing 
to agree to commit a violent felony. See United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218, 
1222 (11th Cir. 2010). 
98 127 CONG. REC. 22,669–70 (1981) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
99 S. 52, 98th Cong. § 2 (1984). 
FINAL_TIPPETT 6/28/2016  2:54 PM 
2015] ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 1269 
Even when Congress, in 1986, broadened the definition of violent 
felony to include the residual clause, now unconstitutional, it 
continued to exclude conspiracy in the amendment to the 
definition of violent felony.100  This repeated exclusion indicates 
that the amorphous risks posed by conspiracy crimes are outside 
the scope of Congress’s intended definition of violent felony.101 
Further examination of the legislative history shows that 
Congress intended for the ACCA to protect communities by 
removing recidivists from American streets.102  Lawmakers’ focus 
was on criminals who repeatedly commit substantive  
offenses—who essentially make their living off of the commission 
of violent crimes.103  In his sponsor statement, Senator Arlen 
Specter noted that career criminals often commit “scores of 
offenses” and cited to a study that “showed that only 49 
imprisoned robbers admitted committing 10,000 felonies over 20 
years.”104  The congressional records suggest that Senator Specter 
was referring to individuals who committed the substantive 
violent felonies, not criminals who agreed to commit violent 
felonies.105  When describing the purpose of the ACCA, Senator 
Specter expressly focused on “a relatively small number of career 
criminals [who] commit a very large number of robberies and 
burglaries” and did not mention conspiracy to commit any 
crime.106  Further, Senator Specter supported this stated focus 
with information about substantive offenses, not conspiracies to 
commit violent felonies.107  Evidently, the ACCA targets 
individuals who terrorize their communities through repeated 
100 Congress’s failure to include conspiracy crimes in 1986 is not an express 
rejection, but it does indicate that conspiracy crimes are not automatically violent 
felonies under the ACCA, and it suggests that they are still not the type of crimes 
that Congress intended to address. 
101 127 CONG. REC. 22,669 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
102 130 CONG. REC. 29,671, 29,688, 29,695–96 (1984); 129 CONG. REC. 598–99 
(1983) (focusing specifically on robbery and burglary). 
103 127 CONG. REC. 22,670 (statement of Sen. Specter) (“Career criminals often 
have no lawful employment; their full-time occupation is crime for profit and many 
commit crimes on a daily basis.”). 
104 H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 3 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 
3663. 
105 127 CONG. REC. 22,670 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
106 Id. at 22,669; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 3, as reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3663. 
107 127 CONG. REC. 22,669 (statement of Sen. Specter) (“Burglary is now so 
common it affects 1 household in every 14 each year. That means, on the average, 
one burglary for every street in America.”). 
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violent felonies rather than those who only get so far as 
conspiracy.108  To extend § 924(e)(B)(2)(i) to conspiracy crimes is 
to impermissibly reach beyond the purpose of the ACCA.109 
Additionally, the lawmakers’ focus on those criminals 
responsible for the bulk of substantive violent felonies is evident 
in subsequent congressional discussion of violent crime.  For 
example, when advocating a bill to disarm “repeat violent 
criminals,” Senator Mike DeWine said, “[T]he vast majority of 
crimes that hurt people are committed by a small number of the 
criminals.”110  Senator DeWine specifically mentioned those 
crimes that “hurt people,” suggesting that, in addressing violent 
crime, he meant those substantive offenses that cause tangible 
harm to communities as opposed to conspiracy offenses.111  
Moreover, Senator Specter’s subsequent remarks about the 
ACCA reaffirm his apparent rejection of conspiracy crimes as 
violent felonies.112  In 2010, Senator Specter proposed an 
amendment to the ACCA to clarify the definition of violent felony 
by removing the residual clause and focusing on elements, 
conduct, and offenses that involve “conduct that presented a 
serious potential risk of bodily injury to another.”113  Similar to 
his advocacy for the ACCA in the 1980s, Senator Specter’s 
108 Id. at 22,670 (“A high percentage of robberies and burglaries are committed 
by a limited number of repeat offenders.”); see also 130 CONG. REC. 31,742 (1984) 
(statement of Rep. Patterson) (“Just getting this segment of the criminal population 
off the street will have a major impact on crime.”). Since any conspiracy statute that 
includes an overt act requirement does not require that the overt act itself be illegal, 
the core act in conspiracy is agreement. See supra Part I.B.2. 
109 Congressional intent for the ACCA can be found in the Congressional Record. 
See 130 CONG. REC. 29,671, 29,688 (statement of Sen. Biden); 129 CONG. REC. 599 
(1983) (statement of Sen. Specter) (focusing specifically on robbery and burglary). 
110 142 CONG. REC. 8,234 (1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine). Senator DeWine 
continued, “One estimate is that 70 percent of all violent crime in this country is 
committed by less than 6 percent of the criminals, which is a relatively small 
number of people.” Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See 156 CONG. REC. 22,586–87 (2010). Congress did not enact Senator 
Specter’s proposed Armed Career Criminal Sentencing Act of 2010. See generally 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
113 156 CONG. REC. 22,587. Senator Specter rejected the Supreme Court’s 
categorical test, stating, “Federal judges are capable of examining and evaluating 
reliable evidence to determine if a particular conviction or series of convictions 
merits enhancement and should be entrusted to continue their historic role as 
sentencing fact finders.” Id. 
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proposed amendment did not mention conspiracy crimes.114  In 
fact, his focus on elements, conduct, and serious risk of bodily 
injury to others confirms that “violent felony” refers to 
substantive offenses—those that necessitate the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical harm against others—and not 
conspiracy offenses—those that only raise the probability that a 
crime will be committed.115 
B. Application of the Categorical Test and Statutory 
Interpretation to the ACCA 
Further analysis of the categorical test, and judicial 
interpretation of the ACCA as a whole, indicates that 
conspiracies are not violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  The 
Supreme Court has consistently stated, “ ‘[T]he only plausible 
interpretation’ of the [ACCA] . . . requires use of the categorical 
approach.”116  However, the majority approach distorts the 
categorical test to the point that it is no longer recognizable.  
Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the categorical 
approach does not allow courts to include the elements of the 
underlying violent felony in the elements of the charged 
conspiracy.117  Thus, when determining whether conspiracy to 
commit a violent felony is a violent felony, courts are limited to 
considering the elements of the charged conspiracy crime,118 and 
those elements typically do not categorically involve the actual, 
attempted, or threatened use of physical force against another. 
1. Proper Application of the Categorical Test Does Not Include 
Analysis of the Underlying Crime 
In Taylor v. United States,119 the Supreme Court stated, “The 
Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that § 924(e) mandates a 
formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory 
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts 
114 See 156 CONG. REC. 22,586–87; 127 CONG. REC. 22,669 (1981) (statement of 
Sen. Specter). 
115 See United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2010). 
116 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015) (first alteration in 
original). 
117 See id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)) (noting that 
Congress intended that the ACCA only target crimes that fell into certain categories, 
regardless of facts involved in prior convictions). 
118 Id. at 2557. 
119 495 U.S. 575. 
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underlying those convictions.”120  Although, as the Third Circuit 
in United States v. Preston noted, a sentencing court may, when 
necessary, refer to charging documents and the certified record of 
conviction, it may not consider the conspiracy conviction to 
subsume all elements of any crime discussed in the charging 
documents or explained to the jury.121  The categorical test 
requires courts to examine only the elements of the prior 
conviction, not the elements of a crime that might have been.122  
The majority grossly distorts the Supreme Court’s formal 
categorical approach and goes well beyond looking only to the 
elements of the prior conviction.123 
By including the elements of the underlying violent felony as 
elements of the conspiracy to commit the violent felony, 
sentencing courts expand the categorical test to the point of 
uselessness.124  Factually, a conviction for conspiracy to commit 
robbery does not mean that the individual must have also been 
convicted of committing the robbery; thus, it violates common 
sense and the categorical test to consider the elements of robbery 
when deciding whether the conspiracy itself is a violent felony.125  
The categorical approach encompasses only the elements of the 
prior conviction.126  If the individual was not convicted of robbery, 
then robbery and its elements should not be considered by the 
sentencing court.127  Asserting that the conspiracy conviction 
subsumes the elements of the underlying violent felony 
impermissibly mixes two distinct crimes. 
120 Id. at 600. 
121 United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 602. 
122 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. 
123 See supra Part II.A. 
124 The categorical test is only effective in determining whether a crime is a 
violent felony for ACCA purposes because the test targets the exact behavior 
Congress intended to punish through the ACCA and because it is easy for courts to 
apply. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015). 
125 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600 (noting that the categorical test requires sentencing 
courts to consider only elements of the prior conviction). 
126 Id. 
127 See id. 
FINAL_TIPPETT 6/28/2016  2:54 PM 
2015] ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 1273 
2. Properly Applying the Categorical Test To Show That 
Conspiracies To Commit Violent Felonies Are Not Violent 
Felonies 
If courts properly apply the categorical test, looking only to 
the elements of the prior conspiracy to commit a violent felony,128 
then they must determine that the conspiracy itself is not a 
violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  Conspiracy statutes 
generally require only agreement with the intent that the 
underlying crime be committed.129  Some states also require 
commission of any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.130  
Neither of these elements categorically involves the actual, 
attempted, or threatened use of physical force against another.131  
Thus, conspiracy crimes are not violent felonies. 
First, agreement merely requires a conversation between at 
least two individuals and involves no use of force.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines agreement as “a manifestation of mutual 
assent by two or more persons.”132  Even if two individuals agree 
to commit a murder, the actual agreement involves no use of 
force.133  One could imagine scenarios in which a form of 
agreement was secured through the use of force, perhaps through 
threats of violence, but these scenarios would be fact-specific and 
could not be considered under the categorical test.134  Primarily, 
the act of agreement does not involve the use of force.135 
Second, even if the conspiracy statute includes an overt act 
requirement, overt acts do not categorically involve the actual, 
attempted, or threatened use of physical force.136  The overt act 
need not involve any more use of force than the act of 
agreement.137  For example, in United States v. Gore,138 the Fifth 
Circuit interpreted the relevant Texas conspiracy statute that 
128 See id. 
129 See supra Part I.B.2. 
130 See supra Part I.B.2. 
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
132 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (10th ed. 2014). 
133 Physical force is defined as force that involves a physical act, particularly “a 
violent act directed against a robbery victim.” Id. 
134 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
135 See United States v. King, 979 F.2d 801, 802–03 (10th Cir. 1992). 
136 Id. at 803 (“Clearly neither actual nor attempted use of force is required for 
conviction under conspiracy law . . . .”). 
137 The overt act itself may be innocent, and an act qualifies as an overt act even 
if it is only in preparation of a crime. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (10th ed. 2014). 
138 636 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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included an overt act requirement to mean only that the overt act 
take “the conspiracy beyond a mere meeting of the minds.”139  
Presumably, if Gore had driven by the anticipated robbery site a 
week before the agreed-upon date of the robbery to look for a 
good escape route, he would have committed the necessary overt 
act without using any force or involving any other individuals.140  
Such an act, like similar overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, 
while sufficient for a conspiracy conviction, does not involve any 
actual, attempted, or threatened use of force.141  Moreover, while 
the committing an overt act could amount to an attempt to use 
force,142 if the overt act rises to the level of attempt to commit one 
of the violent elements of the underlying violent felony, the crime 
is no longer conspiracy, but a distinct attempt crime.  Thus, any 
overt act element would be insufficient to automatically 
transform conspiracies to commit violent felonies into violent 
felonies. 
Some may argue that, regardless of any overt act element, 
conspiracies to commit violent felonies involve the threatened use 
of physical force.  While the participants in conspiracies to 
commit violent felonies may contemplate using force against 
others, contemplation alone is not a threat.143  A threat is “[a] 
communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on 
another’s property.”144  The essence of a conspiracy is that it is an 
agreement between criminals who presumably do not want to 
attract any attention from law enforcement or third parties.145   
 
 
139 Id. at 736. 
140 The court stated: 
Gore could not have been convicted under Texas law and his indictment 
unless he, with intent that a felony be committed, agreed that [his co-
conspirator] would commit robbery and threaten or place a disabled person 
or a person 65 years of age or older in fear of imminent bodily injury or 
death, and unless [his co-conspirator] committed an overt act in 
furtherance of this agreement. 
Id. This analysis appears to misconstrue the overt act requirement and violates the 
factless spirit of the categorical test. 
141 The mere act of surveying an area in connection with a conspiracy, in 
addition to not involving any actual or threatened force, is virtually 
indistinguishable from lawful activity. 
142 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (2015). 
143 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1708 (10th ed. 2014) (definition of threat). 
144 Id. 
145 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1). 
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Thus, rather than involving force or the threat of force, 
conspiracy crimes typically involve the avoidance of force to 
prevent detection and continue the conspiracy. 
Because neither the act of agreement nor commission of an 
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy categorically involve 
the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force against another 
person, conspiracies to commit violent felonies are not 
themselves violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 
3. Statutory Interpretation of the ACCA’s Definition of Violent 
Felony 
In addition to application of the categorical test, an 
interpretive analysis of the relevant portions of the ACCA 
indicates that the statute does not include conspiracy crimes in 
its definition of violent felony.  As the language of the statute and 
the legislative history indicate, the core of the ACCA’s definition 
of violent felony is aggressive and violent conduct.146  Essentially, 
the type of criminals targeted by the ACCA make careers out of 
acting in a way that consistently puts others at risk of physical 
injury.147  This type of action exceeds mere agreement; it involves 
initiative and actus reus beyond that generally required in 
conspiracy statutes.148 
Even the name of the ACCA, the Armed Career Criminal 
Act, suggests that conspiracy crimes are not within its scope.149  
As the name suggests, the Act targets criminals who have made 
careers from systematically committing dangerous crimes in such 
a way as to suggest that they would be willing to “deliberately 
point the gun and pull the trigger.”150  Yet, to be convicted of 
conspiracy to commit a violent felony, a criminal does not need to 
have a weapon or even plan to use force against anyone else.151 
146 Supra Part I.A. 
147 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008) (noting that 
“callousness toward risk” alone is not enough; the offender also must be willing to 
“pull the trigger”); United States v. White, 571 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating 
that an armed career criminal is someone who displays a “callousness toward risk”). 
148 See United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Fell, 511 F.3d 1035, 1044 (10th Cir. 2007). 
149 See supra note 10 (defining “career criminal”). 
150 Begay, 553 U.S. at 146. 
151 See supra Part I.B.2. 
FINAL_TIPPETT 6/28/2016  2:54 PM 
1276 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1255   
Further, the ACCA already includes a provision to punish 
felons who illegally possess guns or ammunition;152 a criminal 
with prior conspiracy convictions will not go unpunished even if 
the conspiracies are not considered violent felonies for sentencing 
purposes.153  Section 924(a)(2) provides a sentence of not more 
than ten years for felons found in possession of a gun, and felons 
guilty of gun possession under § 922(g) who were previously 
convicted of conspiracies to commit violent felonies would receive 
just punishment under this provision.154  The difference between 
a ten-year maximum and a fifteen-year mandatory minimum is 
significant, and there must be a sufficient reason to subject 
someone to the stricter sentence.155  Conspiracies do not 
categorically involve the use of force against others; prior 
convictions for conspiracies to commit violent felonies should not 
allow for the imposition of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum.  
There is no sufficient reason to impose a fifteen-year minimum 
sentence on a felon in possession of a firearm who was not 
convicted for three prior crimes that involved the actual, 
attempted, or threatened use of force against another.156  After 
all, these two separate sentencing barriers only make sense if the 
separation is carefully maintained.157 
C. Applying the ACCA in Accordance with Realities of Social 
Needs 
Treating conspiracies to commit violent felonies as violent 
felonies defeats the protective purpose for which the ACCA was 
drafted.158  First, the majority’s expansive reading of the ACCA 
and misapplication of the categorical test ignores social changes 
152 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. Such criminals would be punished for illegally possessing firearms 
without being branded violent felons provided they had not been convicted of the 
requisite violent felonies. 
155 Id. § 924(a)(2), (e)(1); Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
156 It stands to reason that if a criminal clearly qualifies for punishment under 
one provision but not another, he should be punished under the first provision. 
157 See § 924(a)(2), (e)(1). 
158 The Committee on the Judiciary indicated that the ACCA was meant to 
protect the public from crimes with substantive effects. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 
(1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661 (“Statistics indicate that nearly 
25 million American households—3 out of every 10—were affected by crimes 
involving theft or violence.”). 
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that have occurred since the conception of the ACCA and 
overlooks the realities involved with applying statutory 
provisions.159  Moreover, punishing conspiracy to commit a 
violent felony as a violent felony is pointless from a utilitarian 
perspective.160  Finally, punishing conspiracy crimes as though 
they are substantive violent felonies is unfair under retributive 
principles of punishing in accordance with moral desert.161 
Since the conception of the ACCA in the early 1980s, violent 
crime rates and public perception have changed.162  Whereas, in 
1984, incarceration and the imposition of mandatory minimums 
were seen as solutions to America’s rampant violent crime 
problem, these same solutions are now widely perceived as 
significant problems themselves.163  There is growing public 
concern over America’s high incarceration rate.164  In a keynote 
address, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch noted the 
Department of Justice’s commitment to reexamining the 
“reliance on incarceration” in the United States.165  Since one of 
the original goals of the ACCA was to appease the public, it is 
time to scrutinize the incarceration system and make sure that 
mandatory minimum sentences are being imposed as narrowly as 
possible.166 
Additionally, including conspiracy crimes as violent felonies 
under the ACCA makes a precise statutory provision ambiguous 
and difficult for courts to apply.  Unlike the residual clause, 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is clear; violent crimes include those that have as 
elements “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
159 Matt Ford, A New Approach to Criminal-Justice Reform, ATLANTIC (Oct. 22, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/police-prosecutors-reform-
group/411775/ (discussing law enforcement and legislator commitment to reforming 
mandatory minimum sentencing to reduce incarceration rates in the United States). 
160 Here, “pointless” means that imposing the mandatory minimum for those 
convicted of violent felonies will not achieve any good result. 
161 MOORE, supra note 95. 
162 See supra Part I.A. 
163 See supra Part I.A. 
164 The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world at 716 per 
100,000 of the national population. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES 1 (10th ed. 2013), 
http://www.apcca.org/uploads/10th_Edition_2013.pdf. 
165 Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Keynote Address at the National Black 
Prosecutors Association Awards Luncheon (July 22, 2015), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-keynote-
address-national-black-prosecutors. 
166 See supra Part I.A. 
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force against the person of another.”167  If a crime, like conspiracy 
to commit a violent felony, does not have elements that involve 
the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force, that crime 
cannot be a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).168  In Johnson 
v. United States,169 the Supreme Court stated that a law, like the 
ACCA residual clause, is vague to the point of violating due 
process when it does not “give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes,” or when it is so devoid of standard that it is 
open to arbitrary enforcement.170  By interpreting conspiracies to 
commit violent felonies as violent felonies, the majority defies the 
letter of the statute and makes a clear standard 
unconstitutionally arbitrary.171  Simply put, conspiracies do not 
categorically involve threatened, attempted, or actual use of 
force.172  If the Supreme Court adopted the majority’s sweeping 
approach, the Court would endorse the same vagueness it 
condemned in its Johnson decision, and lower courts would have 
little concrete guidance for applying § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) of the ACCA 
to other potentially violent felonies.173 
Moreover, neither of the utilitarian justifications for 
punishment—neither deterrence nor incapacitation—is achieved 
by classifying conspiracy as a violent felony.174  Conspiracies do 
not include as elements the use of force against others.175  If 
conspiracy is a violent felony, the definition of violent felony 
under the ACCA becomes too confusing to deter criminals from 
conspiring to commit violent felonies.176  If anything, this 
ambiguous interpretation will encourage violent criminals to be  
 
 
167 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
168 See id. 
169 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
170 Id. at 2556. 
171 See supra Part II.A. 
172 See supra Part I.B.2. 
173 See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
174 The deterrence value of punishment for conspiracies, in general, seems weak 
because any punishment for the substantive offense did not dissuade the offender 
from entering into an agreement to commit the felony in the first place. Peter 
Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 1122, 1184 (1975). 
175 See supra Part I.B.2. 
176 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 678 
(2015). 
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even more careful about concealing conspiracies until the 
substantive crime comes to fruition, leading to the successful 
commission of more substantive violent offenses.177 
Defining conspiracy to commit a violent felony as a violent 
felony is also inconsistent with incapacitation, a theory based on 
isolating high-risk offenders to prevent them from committing 
future crimes.178  The mandatory minimum ensures that 
criminals sentenced under the ACCA will be separated from 
society for at least fifteen years; but, under the majority’s 
approach, criminals who are not, in reality, violent recidivists are 
also separated from society for at least fifteen years.179  
Incapacitation is only effective as a utilitarian measure if the 
benefit of removing the threatening individual from society 
outweighs the financial and social costs.180  Isolating a nonviolent 
offender from society for fifteen years burdens the corrections 
system and does not make communities significantly safer.181  
Worse, if relatively nonviolent offenders who have prior 
convictions for drug offenses and conspiracy crimes are subjected 
to mandatory fifteen-year sentences, they will be living in close 
quarters with actual violent recidivists and may develop into 
violent recidivists themselves.182  If the ACCA mandatory 
minimum is allowed to apply to those who are not actually  
 
177 While most criminals will not think ahead to whether a conviction for a 
conspiracy crime may lead to a later sentencing enhancement, armed career 
criminals might. 
178 Sidhu, supra note 176, at 710. 
179 The imposition of the mandatory minimum means that criminals who are not 
actually a danger to their communities as armed career criminals will not be able to 
contribute to their communities through the workforce or as members of their 
families. 
180 Sidhu, supra note 176, at 678–79. 
181 The Director of the Bureau of Prisons determined that, based on data from 
2011, the average cost of incarceration for a federal inmate for 2011 was $28,893.40. 
Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,711 (Mar. 
18, 2013). In the aggregate, the costs of these additional mandatory years in prison 
for criminals with prior conspiracy convictions may represent a significant burden 
on the American taxpayer, and there is little social utility in the enhanced sentence 
if the criminal is not, in fact, a violent career criminal. 
182 Prison violence is a prevalent problem, and if objectively nonviolent offenders 
are sentenced to a mandatory fifteen years in this violent environment, it stands to 
reason that they could become violent themselves to cope with that environment. See 
Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 881, 915–16 (2009); Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of 
Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1245 (2012). 
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violent career criminals, the punishment may create more 
criminals instead of incapacitating those who present real 
threats to society. 
Additionally, a person who conspires to commit a violent 
felony and one who commits the substantive crime commit 
different wrongs; inflicting the same punishment on each is 
inconsistent with the principal tenant of retributivism, punishing 
according to moral desert.183  For retributivists, punishment 
should be proportionate to desert, meaning “the more desert, the 
greater the punishment.”184  Offenders who do not have three 
prior convictions for substantive violent felonies do not deserve to 
be subjected to the ACCA mandatory minimum; such a 
punishment would not be proportionate to the crime.185  For 
example, Darnell Mitchell was sentenced under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) 
because the court held that his prior robbery convictions were 
violent felonies.186  Jerome Wilkerson was sentenced under the 
same provision because the court held that his prior conviction 
for conspiracy to commit a robbery was a violent felony.187  
Mitchell and Wilkerson, convicted of very different crimes, were 
sentenced under the same statute even though only Mitchell’s 
crime involved the use of force.188  Congress could not have 
intended for the ACCA to be applied in such an unequal 
manner.189 
Moreover, retributive principles of victim vindication 
indicate that criminals guilty of conspiracies to commit violent 
felonies do not deserve the same punishment as criminals guilty 
183 THOM BROOKS, PUNISHMENT 16 (2013). 
184 Id. 
185 Serious drug offenses, either alone or in combination with violent felonies, 
also qualify for imposition of the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). 
186 United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (6th Cir. 2014). 
187 United States v. Wilkerson, 286 F.3d 1324, 1325–1326 (11th Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam). 
188 Under Tennessee law, Mitchell’s prior robbery conviction involved knowing 
theft by violence or instilling fear. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-401 (West 2016); 
Mitchell, 743 F.3d at 1057. Conversely, Wilkerson’s prior conviction for conspiracy to 
commit robbery, which Florida recognizes as separate and distinct from the 
underlying crime, involved only agreement with at least one other person to commit 
“any offense.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 (West 2016); Blackburn v. State, 83 So. 2d 
694, 695 (Fla. 1955). 
189 When describing the ACCA, Senator Specter stated that burglaries and 
robberies are some of the “most vicious” forms of common crimes. 129 CONG. REC. 
599 (1983). 
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of substantive violent felonies.190  In describing victim 
vindication, Jean Hampton asserts, “What is ‘deserved’ . . .  refers 
to what is perceived as necessary to humble the wrongdoer and 
thereby vindicate the victim’s value.”191  A person convicted of a 
conspiracy crime deserves less punishment than one convicted of 
a substantive violent felony because the conspirator did not 
“master” a victim in the way that one who completed an offense 
might have.192  In conspiracy crimes, there are usually no victims 
that need to be vindicated because intended victims are likely not 
even aware of any conspiracy, much less harmed by one.193  
However, in a substantive offense, a victim is appreciably 
harmed by either loss of property, physical injury, or fear of 
imminent injury.194  Including conspiracy as a violent felony 
wrongfully implies that both crimes deserve the same level of 
punishment. 
Notably, retributivists “do not punish a criminal for what 
[they] think she might do tomorrow, but what she has done.”195  
Future risk posed by conspiracies is irrelevant under this 
analysis.196  A criminal convicted of an undisputably violent 
felony, like robbery, committed an aggressive act that put others 
at risk of injury, whereas the culpable acts of a criminal 
convicted of conspiracy were mainly agreement and perhaps 
commission of a potentially harmless overt act.197  To subject 
these different criminals to the same punishment would wrongly 
punish the criminal convicted of conspiracy to commit a violent 
felony for “what we think she might do tomorrow.”198 
190 See Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 
128 (Jules Coleman ed., 1988). Hampton contends that retributivism should focus on 
vindicating the worth of a victim relative to the offender by subjecting the offender 
to “something comparable” to the harm the offender inflicted on the victim. Id. 
191 Id. at 158. 
192 See id. at 127–28. 
193 Conspiracy does not as a rule create danger of interaction with a victim, 
meaning there is not even opportunity to use, attempt, or threaten to use physical 
force against anyone in the categorical conception of conspiracy. See United States v. 
King, 979 F.2d 801, 803 (10th Cir. 1992). 
194 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1 (burglary), 222.1 (robbery), 223.4 
(extortion) (2015). 
195 BROOKS, supra note 183. 
196 See supra Part II.A. 
197 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
198 BROOKS, supra note 183. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ACCA is a very powerful tool that can protect the public 
from armed career criminals, those recidivists who have 
demonstrated that they present a substantial danger to their 
communities.  However, if the tool is not used precisely, it 
becomes completely ineffective; rather than improving 
communities and dealing out just deserts, the ACCA mandatory 
minimum becomes an injustice, a way to pile prison years on 
objectively nonviolent offenders.  After all, the difference between 
categorically including and excluding conspiracy crimes as 
violent felonies could mean more than a mandatory extra decade 
in prison for a defendant.199 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court recognized this injustice by 
finding the ACCA’s residual clause to be unconstitutional for just 
this reason; the residual clause was too vague to serve any social 
good.200  While Johnson remedied the injustice of sentencing 
conspiracy crimes as violent felonies under the residual clause, 
the majority of circuit courts still erroneously sentence 
conspiracies as violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  Defining 
prior conspiracies to commit violent felonies as violent felonies 
impermissibly extends the ACCA beyond congressional intent 
and the plain meaning of the text.  To ensure that the ACCA is 
properly used against “the kind of person who might deliberately 
point the gun and pull the trigger,” conspiracies to commit 
violent felonies cannot be considered violent felonies.201 
 
 
199 Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4. 
200 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
201 See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008). 
